Papua New Guinea economic survey: transforming good luck into policies for long-term growth by Chand, Satish
1Economic survey
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Papua New Guinea economic survey:
transforming good luck into policies
for long-term growth
Satish Chand
Satish Chand is Director
of the Pacific Policy
Project, Asia Pacific
School of Economics and
Government, The
Australian National
University, Canberra.
The PNG economy has shown signs of recovery throughout
2003, with the rebound in GDP due to a combination of good
weather and healthy prices for exports. The trade account is
in surplus, and the construction, retail and wholesale sectors
are experiencing positive growth. The current level of
growth of output, however, is insufficient to bring about a
rise in per capita income, which has been falling for the past
decade. The budget is still in deficit despite the favourable
conditions, public debt is at record levels, and political and
policy instability remain of serious concern. This window of
opportunity, therefore, must be used to improve the
domestic environment for long-term growth. High on the
list of policy priorities are a return to fiscal sustainability,
efforts to reduce the costs of doing business, and a push to
completing long-instituted reforms.
Papua New Guinea’s gross domestic product
(GDP) is estimated to have increased in the
2003 calendar year due, in the main, to
increased prices for commodity exports
combined with good weather at home.1 This
is welcome news as GDP contracted over the
three preceding years, by 1.2 per cent in 2000,
3.4 per cent in 2001, and by a further 3 per
cent in 2002 (Bank of Papua New Guinea
2003c). GDP is estimated to have expanded
by 2.4 per cent in 2003 (Bank of Papua New
Guinea 2003c), some 0.6 percentage points
above the 2003 Budget forecast. This level
of growth, however, is insufficient to see a
rise in per capita GDP. With an annual
population growth rate of approximately 2.5
per cent, per capita income has been falling
at an annual average rate of 1.4 per cent for
the decade to 2002 (see Figure 1). As a
consequence, poverty has been rising. A
national survey conducted in 2001 revealed
that some 37 per cent of the population lived
below the poverty line where the poverty
line was set at an income level of K461 per
adult: an amount considered as necessary
to purchase food for sufficient energy intake.
The study also revealed that some 93 per
cent of the poor lived in rural areas and that
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some 41 per cent of the rural population fell
below the poverty line.2
The recent positive signals for the
economy include a rebound in primary
exports and growth in credit to the primary
sector. The improvement in economic activity
in the mineral sector was due to an increase
in oil production combined with higher export
prices for crude oil, gold and copper. The non-
mineral sector was also displaying healthy
activity as production of all of the major
agricultural and log exports, except for copra,
were increasing. The growth in primary
production and exports has been due to a
fortuitous combination of good weather
conditions and a healthy increase in the price
of Papua New Guinea’s principal exports. The
rebound in agricultural production and in the
mineral sector has propelled growth in
manufacturing, transport, and the wholesale
and retail sectors. The construction sector is
also expected to record increased activity due
to ongoing infrastructure projects including
major road maintenance work on the
Highlands Highway, and the construction
of the Napa Napa oil refinery and the Wewak
tuna processing facility. The stimulus to
construction activity, however, will be short-
lived as these projects are soon due for
completion and there are no major new
projects on the horizon. The improvement in
the fiscal position was due to a combination
of increased revenues and expenditure
restraints; the latter being dominated by cuts
to the development budget. The rebound in
growth is fragile; fiscal stress, inflationary
pressures, and political and policy instability
remain to be fully contained.
The main messages of this paper may
be summarised as follows. Economic
management increasingly impacts on the
welfare of the wider population, thus the
Figure 1 Papua New Guinea: gross domestic product, 1990–2002 (level and growth rate,
million kina)
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recovery in 2003 is welcome. The recent
rebound in GDP, however, was in the main
due to good luck rather than a change in the
fundamentals, thus the strong case for
consolidation on current gains to institute
long-standing reforms to improve the growth
prospects for the economy. The current level
of growth, moreover, is not sufficient to
increase per capita income (which requires
aggregate GDP to grow in excess of 2.5 per
cent). Improving the investor climate will
raise the growth potential of the economy:
this will involve fiscal consolidation, an
improvement in law and order and improved
access to basic services. The favourable
climate at home and healthy international
prices for exports provide an opportunity to
commence reforms to address the deep and
long-standing structural problems of fiscal
imbalances, rising debt levels of the public
sector, and falling private investments.
The increasing impact of economic
management on community
welfare
Some 85 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s
population and some 93 per cent of its poor
live in rural areas and draw their livelihood
from the land, thus growth of non-mining
GDP is critical for poverty reduction. Tree
crops such as coffee, cocoa, and oil palm
provide an increasing share of household
income,3 enabling rural households to
substitute away from subsistence agriculture
to store-bought and often imported items
such as rice, flour and tinned fish. This
substitution allows households to specialise
in production and save, and thus smooth
consumption over time, while at the same time
exposing them to the vagaries of the monetary
economy including to inflation and changes
in international commodity prices.4 Thus,
while the rural household of the previous
generation had to face the consequences of
the immediate environment, their present-day
counterparts are exposed to a much wider
geography. Such increased exposure provides
opportunities for diversification of
consumption risks as those that arose
following the prolonged drought of 1997. It
is only when costs of trade are low, with
ready access to financial services and the
formal economy, that the individual can take
the maximum benefit from international
commerce.
While the wider market provides oppor-
tunities to increase income and hedge against
the vagaries of the immediate environment, it
also increases the dependence of households
on institutions and infrastructure that
facilitate trade across the wider geography.
Most importantly, a rising share of trade is
taking place beyond the wantoks, thus there
is an increasing reliance on national and
international institutions, including the
formal payments systems and basic trust
between contracting parties. The individual
now relies on formal instruments such as the
banks and courts to enable impersonal
exchange both across space and over time.
Consequently, economic management and
the costs of trade play an increasingly
important role in determining the income
and welfare of villagers. The Papua New
Guinea state has, in many respects, been
deficient in providing a sound basis for such
exchanges to take place.
The poor development record
The development record of Papua New
Guinea post-independence, both in relation
to its neighbours and to its own past, has
been poor. Average per capita income of
US$530 (in 2002) and life expectancy at birth
of 57 years is amongst the lowest in the region
(Table 1). Anecdotal evidence suggests that
Papua New Guinea has its fair share of
wealthy individuals;5 thus the low average
income suggests a higher income variability
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than the rest of Melanesia. The low life
expectancy is due to the high infant mortality
that drags down the average life expectancy
at birth. Moreover, the variability in infant
mortality within Papua New Guinea is a lot
larger than that between the countries listed
in Table 1. Infant mortality ranges from a high
of 111 for the Gulf province to 40 for Manus;
the Island regions perform better on this
measure than the Highlands.6 To the extent
that it impacts on the costs of transportation,
geography may partly explain this difference.
The large variability in infant mortality is
also likely to reflect the disparity in access to
basic healthcare, education and transport-
ation services: the first has a direct link while
the latter two are indirectly related. Of grave
concern is the fact that infant mortality
worsened from 72 per thousand live births
in 1980 to 82 by 1991, followed by a modest
improvement to 79 by 2002. Life expectancy,
however, improved from 52 years in 1980 to
57 years by 2002.7
Papua New Guinea has faced some
difficult development challenges since
independence. The difficult terrain, together
with the highly fragmented population, has
made the task of nation building difficult.
The people, who draw affinity from their
customary and communally owned land or
language group (wantoks), have remained
divided: the nation, thus, may be akin to a
loose federation between groups.8 Strong
local communities in an environment of a
weak over-arching state in a topographically
difficult terrain for communication and trade
has made deep integration between
communities difficult. The costs of commodity
trade are high due to poor infrastructure,
while labour mobility is difficult given the
communal land tenure that restricts
acquisition of land for housing. In this
environment, creating smoothly functioning
markets with impersonalised trade across the
nation and abroad is indeed a difficult task.
The Bougainville war and several natural
disasters, including a record drought in 1997,
have added to the challenges of economic
management in recent years. The nation,
however, has also enjoyed significant resource
discoveries in its post-independence period.
Contemporary Papua New Guinea is the
net effect of its fortunes, misfortunes,
management, and its past mismanagement.
Table 1 Basic regional indicators for 2002
Life expectancy Per capita GNI Infant mortality Illiteracy
(years at birth) (US$) (per ‘000 births) (15+ population,
per cent)
Fiji 70 2,160 18 7
Samoa 69 1,420 18 1
Vanuatu 69 1,080 33 ..
Indonesia 67 710 33 17
Solomon Islands 69 570 21 ..
Papua New Guinea 57 530 79 35
Source: World Bank Development Economics Central Database, available at http://wb.forumone.com/
knowledge.
5Economic survey
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
The poor developmental record post-
independence is testimony to the fact that
policies on the whole have not been conducive
to widespread growth in income.
Macroeconomic performance
Real GDP for the decade to 2002 increased at
an annual average rate of 1.1 per cent; with
an annual average rate of population growth
of 2.5 per cent over the period, per capita
GDP has declined at an average annual rate
of 1.4 per cent. Agriculture accounts for
approximately 30 per cent of GDP and less
than 20 per cent of exports but provides the
livelihoods of approximately 90 per cent of
the population. Mining accounts for 21 per
cent of GDP and some 75 per cent of exports
in the form of gold, crude oil, copper and
silver. Manufacturing accounts for 9 per cent
of GDP and is mostly in the form of small-
scale production for the domestic market.9
The output of the primary sectors depends
heavily on weather conditions, particularly
on the level and distribution of rainfall, since
all of the agricultural production is rain fed,
while transportation of copper concentrate
from Ok Tedi, the largest mine, is via the Fly
River. Adverse weather conditions, therefore,
impact heavily on the level of GDP and
exports and output varies considerably from
year to year (Figure 1). The low rates of growth
of output over the long term, however, are
due to structural deficiencies.
The government continues to draw on
domestic savings to fund its budget deficits.
During 2003, delays in privatisation and the
holding back of a US$35 million tranche of a
loan for the Public Sector Reform Program
by the Asian Development Bank created
added pressures for domestic financing,
driving up interest rates in a thin domestic
capital market. In attempting to contain
inflationary pressures, over the 12 months
to June 2003 the central bank tightened
monetary policy through increases in the
kina facility rate, thus compounding the
problems for growth of private enterprise by
making investments more costly (Table 2). At
least a part of the deficit will have to be
monetised should external support not be
secured soon. The combination of fiscal
excess and a tight monetary stance runs the
risk of landing the economy in a trap of high
and rising inflation and/or nominal interest
rates with low growth of output. The weighted
average interest rates on performing loans
Table 2 Papua New Guinea: latest macroeconomic indicators
Indicator
Annual increase in CPI to June 2003 (per cent) 19.00
28-day Treasury Bill rate as of 3 October 2003 (per cent) 18.45
Annual increase in public sector credit to August 2003 (per cent) 17.00
Annual increase in private sector credit to August 2003 (per cent) –2.50
Weighted average lending rate on performing loans (per cent) 14.80
Weighted average rate on deposits with commercial banks (per cent) 4.60
Gross foreign reserves as of June 2003 (months of import cover) 3.70
Public debt at December 2002 (per cent of GDP) 76.00
Source: Data compiled from the Bank of Papua New Guinea’s online database, available at http://
www.bankpng.gov.pg.
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from the commercial banks as of June 2003
was 14.8 per cent while the interest rate on
deposits was 4.6 per cent. With annual (CPI)
inflation of 19 per cent,10 the corresponding
real rates were –4 and –14.4 per cent on
borrowings and savings, respectively. The
negative real interest rates act as an
impediment to savings that could in turn lead
to dwindling net savings in the economy as
a whole. The only way out of this situation is
through a resolution of the deficit bias and a
return to fiscal sustainability such that
inflationary and interest rate pressures can
be contained and brought down to inter-
nationally competitive levels.
The Bank of Papua New Guinea has
signalled its belief that inflationary pressures
may be easing with its cuts of the kina facility
rate in August and October. It also cut the
commercial banks cash reserve requirement
in October. The government used the higher-
than-expected tax revenues and royalties,
and sales from public assets (K60 million),
to pay off Treasury Bills and the temporary
advance from the Bank. However, these are
one-off measures that cannot be a source of
long-term relief. With its emphasis on
controlling departmental expenditures, the
2004 Budget brought down by the govern-
ment suggests that inflationary pressures
may still be present.
Papua New Guinea’s external position
has improved over 2003 with the current
account recording a deficit of K82 million to
June and with the Bank of Papua New
Guinea expecting a surplus of K575 million
(equal to US$175 million or 5 per cent of
GDP) for the 2003 calendar year. Foreign
exchange reserves at the end of June 2003
amounted to K1,283 million (equal to
US$360.7 million) and sufficient for 3.7
months of total and 4.7 months of non-
mineral import cover. The appreciation of the
kina against the US dollar and improvements
in the current account and foreign reserves
positions are due to improvements in
commodity prices, together with a positive
supply response (see Figure 2 and Bai 2003).11
Receipts from mineral exports have increased
as a result of higher international prices for
copper, gold and crude oil, more than
offseting the falls in the volume of gold and
copper exports. Oil production has increased,
with declines from Kutubu and Gobe fields
more than offset by increased production
from the Moran field. According to the
Department of Petroleum and Energy,
production for the first nine months of the
year was 7.7 per cent higher than for the same
period last year, while total oil export
earnings were 23 per cent higher.
Export earnings from agricultural
commodities have increased in 2003 due to
increased prices as well as increased volumes.
In relation to the domestic price levels in June
2002, coffee prices increased by 4.8 per cent,
cocoa by 19.9 per cent, copra by 81.8 per cent,
logs by 0.5 per cent, palm oil by 25.9 per cent,
and rubber by 57.2 per cent. The weighted
average price of agricultural, forestry and
marine products increased by 13.4 per cent
(Bank of Papua New Guinea 2003b:12).
Favourable weather conditions saw an
improvement in the volume of coffee and
cocoa production while the higher inter-
national prices were due to adverse supply
shocks including further reductions in coffee
area in Vietnam, and continued civil unrest
in the Ivory Coast (the largest cocoa producer).
The rise in the price of palm oil is due to
declining production from Malaysia and
Indonesia and to increased demand from
China. Papua New Guinea’s major exports
face volatile international prices; agricultural
products face relatively greater volatility as
they are subject to high levels of government
intervention and therefore lack well-
developed futures markets as well as being
more prone to weather conditions (Figure 3).
The favourable conditions in terms of
high international prices or good weather
conditions in Papua New Guinea will not
7Economic survey
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last, thus the current window of opportunity
has to be used to improve the inter-
national competitiveness of these industries.
Improving infrastructure and raising
productivity via improved farming practices
could substantially lower costs of production,
thus consolidating the gains of the recent past.
In contrast, the idea being floated of a 50 per
cent tax on cocoa exports in order to make a
cocoa processing factory profitable is indeed
misguided. Implementation of such a tax
would effectively transfer a large share of
cocoa farmers’ incomes to the owners of the
cocoa processing factory and substantially
reduce the volume of cocoa harvested. Ghana
tried a similar scheme with cocoa that nearly
killed the industry: cocoa exports fell from 19
per cent of GDP in 1955 to less than 3 per cent
by 1983.12
The depreciation of the kina in recent
years has raised prices of exports and
importable commodities in kina terms; the
kina is now appreciating against the US
dollar (but has remained stable against the
Australian dollar) so that kina prices of
exports are likely to stabilise and possibly
fall in the absence of increases in world prices
(see Figure 2). The barter terms of trade could
worsen as the price of exports is denominated
in US dollars while the bulk (some 60 per
cent) of imports are from Australia and
denominated in Australian dollars. Supplies
would have to increase if income from exports
continues to rise in the face of falling kina
price of exports.
The fiscal situation remains tight with
debt levels as of June 2003 of approximately
70 per cent of GDP (see Figure 4). Interest
payments accounted for 22 per cent of the
budgeted recurrent outlays for 2003. Revenues
to June 2003 amounted to 41 per cent of the
budget forecast for the year as a whole: while
tax receipts were on par due to buoyant
exports, excise collections fell short of
Figure 2 Papua New Guinea’s foreign exchange reserves (A$) and the exchange rate
(A$/kina), January 2000 to June 2003
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Figure 3 Papua New Guinea: movement in international commodity prices for principal
exports, January 2002–May 2003 (January 2002=100)
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Figure 4 Papua New Guinea: level of public debt and share of interest costs in the
recurrent budget, 1990–2003
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expectations (Table  3). Expenditure to June
2003 amounted to 39 per cent of the budgetary
allocation for the year as a whole. This
reduction was achieved at the expense of
development expenditures that amounted to
21 per cent of the annual allocation. Recurrent
outlays were pushed up by a rise in interest
payments that crowded out other allocations
to the national and provincial governments.13
While collections from export taxes have
grown with exports, excise collections have
failed to keep pace with the growth in the
economy, suggesting that compliance may
be a problem. The containment of the deficit
by curtailing development expenditure is
counterproductive as it depletes the product-
ive potential of the economy. The policy
challenge is to contain the deficit whilst
shifting public outlays towards building the
productive capacity of the economy.
The financing requirements for the
budget to June 2003 comprised a net obligation
on the external sector of K165.4 million. This
amount was raised via a commercial external
loan of K22.8 million, with another K184
million raised domestically. Most of the
domestic funds came from the non-banking
system. The government swapped its
concessional commitment of K22.8 million
for an equivalent loan on commercial terms,
thereby increasing its debt service commit-
ments for the future. The heavy reliance on
domestic financing is unsustainable given
the thin domestic market. Treasury Bill rates
rose across all maturities as a result of
continuous issues of Treasury Bills. The Bank
of Papua New Guinea has been forced to
tighten liquidity conditions to moderate
inflationary pressures from the ensuing fiscal
stimulus. The improving current account
balance has relieved pressure on the exchange
rate, but domestic savings are increasingly
being used to fund the deficit.
The 2004 Budget presented to parliament
on 25 November 2003 continues with the
theme of stabilisation with growth. The
government has committed itself to continuing
with its efforts to promote good governance,
improve economic management, raise public
sector performance, and remove barriers to
investment and economic growth. GDP
growth for 2004 is forecast at 2.8 per cent, the
realisation of which will see some marginal
growth in per capita income. Of a total
expenditure of K4.1 billion, K1.3 billion is for
development, of which K849.7 million (that
Table 3 Papua New Guinea: revenues and expenditure to June 2003
Kina (million) Per cent of 2003 Budget appropriation
Total revenues 1,430.1 41
Tax receipts 1,212.5 49
Foreign grants 124.9 15
Total expenditure 1,448.7 39
Recurrent expenditure 1,196.5 47
Interest payments 374.9 65
Development expenditure 252.2 21
National projects 203.1 21
Budget deficit 18.6
Source: Data drawn from Bank of Papua New Guinea, 2003b. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, June, Port
Moresby:Table 8.1.
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is 67 per cent) is funded via foreign grants.
The infrastructure sector has been allocated
K461.5 million; the largest share from the
development budget, with K121 million
being allocated to fund the ongoing mainten-
ance and rehabilitation of the Highlands
Highway. The social and economic sectors
have been allocated K340.8 million and
K162.4 million, respectively. Members of
parliament have been allocated an additional
K100,000 each as a down payment for
sustaining political stability. In hindsight,
this proved to be futile as the government
was unsuccessful in gaining the necessary
support to allow passage of a constitutional
amendment extending the term from the
current 18 months to three years before a
vote of no-confidence could be moved
against the prime minister. Expenditure
restraints in the form of a recruitment and
wage freeze in the public service are to
continue. The excise on tractors used for
agriculture and forestry work has been
removed while the excise on tobacco and
liquor is frozen to December 2004. Import
duty on poker machines has been reduced
from 175 to 50 per cent. Taxes on log exports
have been reduced by 5 percentage points,
while a 150 per cent deduction now applies
to costs associated with extension services
and research and development for primary
production. Total revenues are estimated to
amount to K3.8 billion—amongst the new
revenue initiatives is an imposition of an
import levy of 2 per cent for 2004 and a
proposal to allow local-level government to
impose a head tax of a maximum of K50 per
individual, or five days of work, and K100
per corporation. The deficit of K300 million
(equal to 2.4 per cent of GDP) is to be funded
with a commercial loan of US$50 million with
the remainder from domestic borrowing. The
continuing deficit together with an increasing
reliance on domestic sources for its funding
will see increased pressure on the domestic
interest rate and possibly inflation.
It is important to understand the origins
of the loss of fiscal discipline if a lasting
solution is to be found to Papua New
Guinea’s current problems of high and rising
debt levels with persistent deficits. Debt levels
and foreign borrowing were kept in check
until the early 1990s since ‘restraint on
foreign borrowing by government was
largely self-enforcing’ (Elek 2001:325) due to
the 1980s debt crisis in many developing
economies, dissuading international banks
from extending further lending to the
developing world. Maintaining fiscal
discipline proved impossible following the
closure of the Bougainville mine in May 1989
due to a sharp contraction in revenues and
loss of export earnings. This was accompanied
with increased expenditure on national
security. The revenue shortfall was
compounded by declining aid, particularly
in per capita terms, as well as the redirection
of this aid away from budgetary support to
program and project aid (see Garnaut 2000
and Elek 2001). The ensuing deficits had to
be financed domestically, thus beginning the
deficit–debt spiral. The resulting excess
demand led to an erosion of foreign exchange
reserves given the fixed exchange rate, a
situation that could not be sustained
indefinitely. The balance of payments crisis
of 1994 was inevitable: it forced the float of
the kina and sharp cuts in public expend-
iture in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
Subsequent extravagances by the state,
sometimes based on overly optimistic revenue
projections, have led to persistent deficits
and rising public debt.
The PNG economy continues to display
the typical symptoms of macroeconomic
stress with high inflation, high interest
rates, persistent deficits, growing debt levels
and a lethargic private sector. The Bank of
Papua New Guinea has had some success
in keeping inflation under control, but this
has been at the cost of high interest rates that
have, in turn, restrained growth of private
11
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enterprise. Real interest rates, however, have
remained low, possibly at a cost to financial
intermediation. The macroeconomic stress
can be sourced to a prolonged deficit bias in
fiscal stance: a correction of such a bias is
necessary to alleviate further build-up of the
macroeconomic problems currently being
experienced.
The above discussion suggests the
following four lessons in relation to strategies
to induce macroeconomic stability.
• Deficits must be contained and possibly
reversed to contain inflationary
pressures, lower interest rates and
stabilise the exchange rate.
• The improvement in the current account
as exports recover provides a window of
opportunity to build reserves and stabilise
the kina, since the favourable external
conditions cannot be assumed to last.
• Foreign financing must be accessed
while productivity of public resources is
improved, given that further funding of
the deficit from domestic sources will put
increased pressure on domestic interest
rates.
• The productive capacity of the economy
has to be expanded to bring the debt to
GDP ratio down, that is, the structural
impediments to growth of output must
be addressed.
On the last, the international competitiveness
of exports can be improved by lowering the
costs of private investment through measures
that lead to policy stability, improved security
of persons and property, long-term and secure
access to land, and better access to
competitively priced credit and utilities. In
sum, the domestic cost structure has to be
brought down to internationally competitive
levels if labour-intensive production is to be
encouraged to absorb the large and growing
pool of underemployed.
Sectoral performance
The primary sectors of the economy have
been showing signs of recovery due to
improvements in the prices of exports
sourced in a combination of a rise in
international prices of cocoa, palm oil and,
lately, vanilla, and the recent depreciation of
the kina. Farmers have responded to the price
signals by increasing supply of these
commodities (see Bai 2003). The past deprec-
iation of the kina has also induced production
of import substitutes such as rice and local
traditional food. Growth of primary production
can be ensured only if it remains profitable.
The question remains as to how to ensure
such an outcome in the face of volatile
international prices and sometimes adverse
weather conditions. Farmers will continue
to produce as long as price falls are at least
offset by reductions in costs and/or increases
in quantity supplied. The case of vanilla is
used here to illustrate the risks and opportun-
ities presented by the international market
in relation to agricultural production.
Vanilla
Vanilla production in Papua New Guinea
has been growing rapidly, driven principally
by rising international prices. The price of
dried vanilla beans rose from US$50 per
kilogram in the year 2000 to US$150 per
kilogram in 2002, and to an all-time high of
US$200 per kilogram in October 2003. The
steady rise in vanilla prices was due to the
fall in supply from Madagascar, the major
natural vanilla producer that accounted for
some 75 per cent of the world’s vanilla
supply. Crops in Madagascar were damaged
in 2000 by a cyclone that wiped out more
than 30 per cent of the vanilla crop and
destroyed storage houses containing much
of the inventory. Since the cyclone, bad
weather has continued to hinder a full
recovery and above average rainfall for the
past two years, especially during the period
12
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Economic survey
of bloom, has kept production well below the
norm. The recovery in vanilla exports from
Madagascar has also been hampered by the
lag between planting and production; it takes
new plants three years to start producing
beans. Vanilla is a highly labour-intensive
crop requiring hand pollination during the
period of bloom, thus it can be a source of
much-needed employment.14 The prevailing
high prices, however, cannot be assumed to
last as supplies from Madagascar and
elsewhere, such as Uganda, will recover
while artificial substitutes will also take
away some of the market. PNG farmers
should capitalise on the favourable prices
but growers must factor in the fact that prices
will fall from the current highs in the near
future. The ability of growers to lower costs
of production and to diversify into crops that
provide the highest returns at any point in
time, therefore, remains critical for continued
growth of agricultural production.
Mining is a significant sector, earning
Papua New Guinea the bulk of its foreign
exchange and providing the state with
significant tax revenues. Mineral exports
have grown in value from K2.4 billion in 1998
to K4.7 billion by the end of 2002. This
increase is due to a combination of the
depreciation of the kina and the rise in
international commodity prices. In terms of
quantities, gold exports of 14.6 tonnes for the
June quarter of 2003 was a tonne lower than
that exported in the corresponding quarter
of 2002. This fall in volume, however, was
offset by a 7 per cent rise in the price of gold
for the period so that export receipts of K584.6
million for the June quarter were 0.5 million
kina above the figure for the corresponding
quarter of 2002. Copper export volumes fell
by 2.2 per cent to 53.2 thousand tonnes in
the June quarter of 2003 compared to the
corresponding quarter of 2002. This was due
to a fall in production from regular mainten-
ance of a mill and reduced shipment due to
low water levels in the Fly River. Crude oil
exports rose by almost 950,000 barrels in the
first nine months of the year to 13.33 million
barrels—an increase of 7.7 per cent on the
same period of 2002. Total oil export earnings
for this period were K1.39 billion, up 23 per
cent on the same period of last year. Declines
in production from Kutubu and Gobe have
been more than offset by production from the
new Moran field. Oil and mineral exploration
expenditures have also increased as a result
of the higher world prices over the past two
years.
Improvements in the current account can
be attributed to a healthy mineral sector: the
continued buoyancy of the sector is critical to
ensuring a stable kina and continued revenues
for the budget. The fall in foreign direct
investments in the sector,15 the fall in crude oil
reserves at existing wells, falling capital
expenditures at several of the mines,16 and the
absence of any major projects coming on
stream over the medium term highlights the
urgency for growth of non-mineral exports to
sustain the kina at current levels and provide
an alternate source of revenues for the state.
The services sector contributes to less
than a third of total GDP with ‘Community,
social and personal services’ alone
accounting for some 13 per cent, ‘Wholesale
and retail trade’ contributes 9 per cent while
‘Transport, storage and communication’ and
‘Construction’ account for 5 per cent and 4
per cent, respectively (data are for 2002). The
informal sector is showing strong signs of
growth as urban populations expand and
demand for services, both legitimate and
illegal, expand. The story of a Goroka woman
making a livelihood out of retailing fresh
vegetables in the Port Moresby market (as
reported in the Post Courier of 2 October 2003)
provides evidence of the enterprising spirit
and the significant potential for the expansion
of the informal sector. This enterprising
woman buys vegetables from farmers from
the Highlands and Central Province to resell
at the Port Moresby market. High-altitude
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crops such as cabbages, lettuce, broccoli,
kaukau and potatoes from the Highlands
travel down the long and sometimes
treacherous Highlands Highway to Lae
before being shipped over to Port Moresby.
Tropical crops such as pawpaw, tomatoes,
eggplants, beans and cucumber travel by
road to Port Moresby from the Central
Province. The retailer is able to meet demand
while being competitive relative to imports.
Profits from the enterprise are used to provide
for the family, including investment in the
education of her four children. There are
parallel stories for several products (including
illegal activities) that are undertaken to meet
‘demand’. Costs determine the ‘competitive-
ness’ across activities including between
those that are legitimate and those that are
not. Policy has a role in inducing one vis-à-vis
the other; this includes encouraging ‘value-
adding’ rather than ‘value-destroying’ (such
as criminal) activities.17
Policies to realise the growth
potential of the economy
Several studies have pointed out that the
major impediments to growth of private
enterprise include the poor law and order
situation that has raised the costs of doing
business; poor public infrastructure that has
raised transportation costs; government
regulation; and ad hoc policy changes
including those relating to international
trade. Duncan and Lawson (1997) and
Levantis and Yala (1998), amongst many
others, claim that the high level of crime is
the single largest hurdle to growth of private
enterprise. According to survey results from
Levantis and Manning (2002), security costs
and those due to theft amounted to 15 per
cent of turnover in the agriculture, forestry
and fisheries sector; 13 per cent in hotel and
restaurant sector; and 12 per cent in building
and construction.18 The survey reveals that
small to medium-sized firms spend some 12
per cent of their gross income on security
while local firms incur higher costs compared
to foreign firms: the simple fact being that
growth of private enterprise is constrained
by the high costs. I have argued elsewhere
(Chand 1997) for a ‘big-push’ to bring levels
of crime down permanently. While manu-
facturing is heavily protected with effective
rates of protection on soap, sugar, tinned fish,
cooking oil, and steel production exceeding
100 per cent, agricultural production is taxed
(see Papua New Guinea 2003:54). In sum,
local firms engaged in the primary non-
mining sector incur the greatest burden from
the poor and deteriorating law and order
problems as well as from the tariffs on their
inputs. They neither have the scale of
operation nor the geographic mobility to be
able to mitigate such costs.
Large firms, most of whom are foreign
owned, are able to minimise the tax crime
imposes on their operation in two ways: first,
they are able to take advantage of economies
of scale in providing security; and second,
they self-select to operate in sectors where
returns are sufficiently high to compensate
for the ‘crime tax’. The crime tax, however, is
not small as noted by Ben Tureia, the
operations coordinator of Porgera Gold Mine,
who is reported as saying that ‘law and order
problems continue to plague the Porgera
Gold Mine’(Post Courier 14 October 2003). He
goes on to note that ‘theft along the Highlands
Highway, illegal mining and blowing up of
power pylons’ are the three main areas of
concern, noting that the mine had lost some
213,804 litres of fuel alone to theft in the
previous 12 months.
The bad crime and governance image of
Papua New Guinea is a major deterrent
against much-needed foreign direct
investment. Attempts by the government to
promote Papua New Guinea as an investment
destination for Asians has been hampered by
this poor image. As an example, Prasong
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Kiratiratana, a Thai wood-processing
executive interested in Papua New Guinea’s
abundant natural resources, noted his
concerns about personal safety and the
security of his assets as reasons for holding
back investments into Papua New Guinea.
Mr Kiratiratana is quoted as saying ‘I don’t
know yet about the local people’s culture,
the country’s regulations and the crime
situation. The big question is the security issue.
I will not make a decision to invest there until
I am confident it is a safe place to be and my
assets are secure’ (Bankok Post, 23 October
2003:3) . The listing of Papua New Guinea as
the fifteenth most corrupt nation in the world
by Transparency International Berlin in its
annual Corruption Perception Index of 133
countries underscores the poor image Papua
New Guinea has amongst foreign investors.
The maintenance of law and order and
public security is a social responsibility and
one that has historically been adequately
provided at the level of the village and the
immediate surroundings. While the costs of
social disruptions to value-adding activities
are internalised at the village level, the same
has not been achieved at the level of the
province or the nation as a whole. Part of the
problem may be due to lack of resources as
Levantis (2000) and Manning (2003) show
that law enforcement agencies are grossly
under-resourced relative to their counterparts
elsewhere. The Australian offer of personnel
and management expertise, including 230
police, and some 20 judges and prosecutors
to increase the quantity and productivity of
resources employed to provide law and order
is, therefore, both welcome and long
overdue.19 This is particularly so since this
assistance is additional to other support that
Australia has historically provided. The test
of success of this assistance will be in the
speed at which the Australian personnel
could be withdrawn whilst permanently
improving the law and order situation in the
country.
Land-based resources such as minerals
and timber that confer significant wealth to
the owners provide incentives to maintain
tight-knit communities around land so as to
minimise the possibility of dissipation of the
ensuing rents across a wider population and
a larger geography. Those distant from the
locality enjoying the riches use bottlenecks
such as those around infrastructure to extract
as much rent as possible. The exorbitant
compensation demands for roads leading to
mines and extortion of infrastructure following
their construction are mechanisms used to
extract the rent. While large fertile resource
endowments may provide the returns
sufficient to meet the above demands, high
grading follows as a natural consequence.
More importantly, sectors with lower levels
of returns such as commercial agriculture are
made commercially non-viable by the taxes
imposed by the exorbitant compensation
demands, with the net effect of an economy
being locked into the resource sector with
high grading and pervasive rent seeking.
If the prevailing situation of low growth,
a strong bias in the structure of production
towards the resource sector, and poor law
and order are the symptoms of an economy
trapped in a low-growth equilibrium, then
the deep causes must be addressed.
Mechanisms to ensure secure and long-term
access to land and means of equitably
sharing resource rents without creating the
incentives for ‘value-destroying’ activities,
such as large compensation claims ex post
investment, must be devised. These are
indeed difficult issues to address and cannot
be adequately addressed here. A start,
however, can be made.
Leasing arrangements that facilitate
long-term secure access to land, giving
security to the lessor while providing an
adequate return to the owner so as to induce
cooperation and therefore leading to the most
productive use of the resource, would be a
significant step in the preferred direction.20
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This is most likely to take place in a stable
macroeconomic climate such that sufficient
value is placed on future output; that is, the
discount rates must be low enough to induce
cooperation between the user of the resource
and the owner. Intermediaries that can match
the long-term demands of the lessor while
preserving the option for short-term access
to land by the owner can assist in this
process.21 Resource discoveries, or the
potential for these, raise the incentives for
non-cooperation significantly. Writing out
complete contingent contracts that can be
enforced ex post of such discoveries is critical:
this requires strengthening of the institutions
of the state.
Political instability that translates
directly into policy instability has been a
pervasive problem. All governments since
independence have been coalitions and none
to date have been able to serve their full term
in office. Political stability has been induced
via legislation in the form of the Integrity of
Political Parties Law, passed in 2001, that
constrains sitting members to vote with their
political party or forgo their seats, and an
amendment to the constitution that disallows
motions of no-confidence to be moved against
the government within the first 18 months of
office. This constitutional amendment has
had some success, but an attempt in November
2003 to extend this grace period to three years
failed to get the necessary support in
parliament. Political competition between
individuals has traditionally been robust, to
the detriment of formation of strong parties.
Development funds are placed within the
control of individual members of parliament,
thus providing public resources to reward
their own support base. The highly fragmented
nature of the PNG state, comprising some
850 language groups, provides a political
climate conducive to individualised political
competition at the highest level of govern-
ment. This is evidenced by the dwindling
number of seats won by members having
majority support in their electorates: of the
109-member parliament, 18 members acquired
majority (that is, greater than 50 per cent)
support from their electorates in the 1977
elections; by the 1997 elections this number
had dropped to four; while the 2002 elections
saw a single candidate amassing more than
50 per cent of the votes from his electorate.22
The strong trend towards candidates winning
seats on a narrow and concentrated support
base when several contestants are present,
has induced use of divisive tactics to fracture
the electorate as well as use of explicit
payments or implicit agreements to do so on
attaining office.23 This has led to a change in
the electoral system from the ‘first-past-the-
post’ system to ‘optional preferential voting’
and then to ‘limited preferential voting’ so
as to induce a widening of the support base
for incoming members of parliament. The
preferential voting system cannot be used
without qualifications given the low literacy
rates, thus the adoption of a system that
allows for three ordered preferences per vote.
It is too early to judge the success of these
electoral changes; in the meantime, policy
instability continues to hamper growth of
output.
Policy instability, including anti-
competitive practices, has raised the cost of
private investment. The decision to maintain
a tariff rate of 70 per cent on sugar to 2010
and a 2003 decision to introduce a 40 per
cent tariff on imports of salt are in conflict
with the long-term commitments made to
trade liberalisation. Such policies reward
rent-seeking activities (including lobbying
for domestic protection) while taxing long-
term private investment in internationally
competitive industries. Ad hoc changes in
policy, moreover, destroy the long-term
credibility of policy pronouncements. Further-
more, the decision to delay liberalisation of
trade is in conflict with the objective of export
promotion, given that a tax on imports is an
equivalent tax on exports (see Papua New
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Guinea 2003). Moreover, a domestic industry
created via protection that survives by taxing
domestic consumers is seldom able to
compete in export markets. It is the domestic
consumers, and particularly the poor, who
pay for high rates of protection such as those
on imported salt, soap, sugar, tinned fish and
biscuits. The high levels of protection have
raised compliance costs by raising the
incentives to circumvent customs regulation.
In a submission to the Tariff Review Taskforce
one business noted that
[i]t’s no great secret that the admin-
istration of customs is openly abused:
misclassification, under-pricing of
invoices subject to tariffs, over-pricing of
nil-rated inputs and subsequent tax
evasion are commonplace (Papua New
Guinea 2003:71).
These problems are created by regulation
that rewards rent-seeking activities: the
obvious solution is to remove such
regulations. If this is not possible in the short
term then the problem can be reduced
significantly by lowering the rates of tariffs
while reducing the number of tariff bands to
minimise the opportunities for customs
misclassification.
The high costs of utilities and transport-
ation services also tax private sector activity.
The government announced its privatisation
strategy to induce greater competition in
these sectors whilst lowering the burden of
poorly performing state-owned enterprises
on the budget (Duncan 2001). Recently
announced changes in policy relating to
privatisation of state assets, however, have
reduced the credibility of long-term commit-
ments to deregulating the economy so as to
induce greater private sector participation in
sectors that to date have remained the
domain of the state. Supporting legislation
creating a Competition Commission to
provide regulatory supervision was passed
in 2002; this was complemented by the
Competitive Conduct Rule passed by parlia-
ment in March 2003, providing for a non-
discretionary (that is, formula-driven) rule for
setting of prices and meeting of minimum
standards by natural monopolies. The
former ELCOM and Harbours Board as state-
owned enterprises were then corporatised,
with ensuing name changes to PNG Power
Ltd and PNG Harbours Ltd, respectively, in
anticipation of privatisation. The government
wrote off a K200 million debt to ELCOM to
ensure solvency of the newly created
corporate entity that henceforth will be
subject to the requirements of the Companies
Act. Despite all of the excellent preparatory
work extending across election cycles, the
privatisation process is now stalled by a
change in policy.
Conclusions
Papua New Guinea’s economic recovery
over the 2003 calendar year is welcome and
long overdue given the falls in GDP over the
preceding three years. Most of the recent
growth in output can be attributed to
favourable weather conditions combined
with improvements in Papua New Guinea’s
terms of trade. These favourable conditions
will not last, so the available window of
opportunity has to be used to consolidate
and build on recent gains. Macroeconomic
conditions remain unfavourable for long-term
investment as the inflation rate and cost of credit
remain high relative to those of Papua New
Guinea’s trading partners and competitor
nations within the developing world. The kina
has stabilised and foreign reserves are
returning to healthy levels: these improve-
ments are due to an improvement in the
current account. The favourable conditions
will not last, however. The weakening of the
US dollar, in which international commodity
prices are mostly denominated, together with
recovery in the global supply of cocoa, oil
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palm and vanilla could result in some
weakening of Papua New Guinea’s terms of
trade over the medium term. It is therefore all
the more urgent to improve the investor
climate to ensure that the growth momentum
is maintained over the medium term.
The prevailing unfavourable macro-
economic conditions in the form of high
inflation and high interest rates on borrow-
ings can be linked to the high level of debt of
the public sector and continuing budget
deficits that are being financed domestically,
given the impasse on access to foreign funds.
Public debt at around 70 per cent of GDP
(indeed much higher if contingent debt is
factored in, and with nearly 70 per cent of
this debt being foreign) is high by developing
economy standards and must be lowered if
interest rates and inflation are to be brought
down. Debt service costs at some 20 per cent
of the recurrent budget is a considerable
burden and one that crowds out expenditure
on basic services.24 The economy is in all
likelihood caught in a high debt and
persistent deficit spiral. The government is
making every effort to contain expenditures
but most of the cuts to date have been in the
development budget rather than in recurrent
outlays. The 2004 Budget emphasis on cuts
in departmental expenditures accompanied
with increased allocations for basic service
delivery is welcome. Attempts to increase
revenues at the local level via a head tax
would be difficult given the costs of
enforcing compliance: explicit use of user-
pays could have been a better alternative.
The risk in cutting developmental outlays is
that it can diminish the productive potential
of the economy. The economic recovery over
the first half of 2003 has seen tax revenues
increase and this may have alleviated some
of the pressures for expenditure restraint, but
the favourable conditions will not last unless
private sector investment picks up.
The productive potential of the economy
is constrained by unfavourable macro-
economic conditions, poor law and order
situation, and the high costs of doing
business. The main policy initiatives that
could be used to lower the cost of private
enterprise include the following.
• Policy stability—this has to be restored
such that private enterprise can plan with
greater confidence about the direction of
future policy. Contradictions in the form
of protection provided to domestic
industry while stressing export-led
growth have to be avoided.
• Fiscal sustainability—must be restored
if price stability and competitive interest
rates are to be achieved
• The public sector—must focus its efforts
on providing public goods while creating
the conditions for the private sector to
provide investment and employment.
The emphasis within the 2003–2007
medium-term development strategy on
public investments in basic health, primary
education, maintenance of infrastructure,
and facilitation of access to markets as the
instruments for poverty reduction is indeed
in this very spirit. The issue is whether action
will be consistent with the rhetoric.
Notes
1 Adverse weather and political conditions in
the major coffee, cocoa and vanilla producers
were responsible for the price rise for these
commodities.
2 As reported in Asian Development Bank
(2003:8), which draws on World Bank (2001).
3 As an example, the oil palm sector as of 2003
provided employment to some 6,000
workers with a total of 30,000 hectares under
cultivation; this is double the figure a decade
back (information provided by New Britain
Palm Oil Limited).
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4 The inroads tinned fish and rice have made
into the hinterlands and cash into cultural
transactions are indications of this
phenomenon.
5 A casual observer to Port Moresby notes the
large number of luxury vehicles relative to
any other island-capital city in the South
Pacific.
6 The data are for 1991 as reported in United
Nations Children’s Fund (1996:73, Table 4.2.1.
7 The data used in this paper are from World
Bank and official PNG sources; their quality,
however, is poor and thus care must be taken
in interpreting the reported figures.
8 Secessionist demands by various groups
have a long history predating independence.
9 Mineral exports accounted for 75 per cent of
total export earnings in 2002 (comprising
gold, crude oil and copper contributing 36,
23 and 16 per cent, respectively), agricultural
products accounted for 17 per cent, forestry
accounted for 7 per cent, while marine
products contributed 1 per cent.
1 0 CPI inflation has fallen from the highs with
Bank of Papua New Guinea officials suggesting
that it was 11.5 per cent by October 2003.
1 1 The Bank of Papua New Guinea employs
exchange control, thus the build up of
reserves cannot be attributed solely to
improvements in the trade account.
1 2 The National Executive Council via its
decision 294/2003 has established a committee
to consider the incentives to be offered to
Niugini Cocoa Factory Limited to facilitate
the establishment of the processing plant. The
Post Courier of 14 January 2004 reports the
Minister for Agriculture as having ruled out
the option of the 50 per cent tax.
1 3 It is estimated that some 10 per cent of the
total salaries and wages bill of approximately
K1.2 billion is accounted for by ‘ghost’
workers (see Manning et al. 2003).
1 4 Vanilla plants blossom at dawn and the
flowers wilt by the afternoon and die soon
afterwards if not pollinated, thus the flowers
must be pollinated on the day if fruit is to be
harvested some nine months later.
1 5 The capital account recorded nil transactions
for the June quarter of 2003.
1 6 Lihir and Porgera mines are exceptions in
this regard.
1 7 Levantis (2000) uses survey data to suggest
that criminal activity provides an average
income that is 64 per cent higher than the
minimum basic wage rate for unskilled
workers.
1 8 These costs are an under estimate of the
‘crime tax’ as it omits costs incurred by firms
that have exited the industry, reduced scale
of output and markets for firms remaining
in the industry, and the loss of output of those
firms deterred from participating in the first
place.
1 9 As part of the broader package of assistance,
the Australian Federal Treasury and Finance
are to provide an additional 36
professionals to improve economic and
financial management while 10 officials are
to be posted to streamline Papua New
Guinea’s immigration and improve border
and transport security. This assistance will
cost A$800 million over five years and is
additional to the current annual aid of A$330
million.
2 0 This is much akin to the challenge of turning
a prisoners’ dilemma into a prisoners’ delight.
2 1 The challenge here is parallel to that of a
depositor with a bank who wants ready
access to liquidity while the investor wants
long-term secure access to the credit from
the bank.
2 2 Of the 109 sitting members, 89 lost their seats
in the 2002 elections, underscoring the
‘revolving door’ nature of entry and exit
from the parliament.
2 3 A failed candidate from the island region in
the 2002 elections informed the author that
he spent half a million kina in the campaign;
and that candidates in the Highlands spent
up to K2 million for their campaigns.
2 4 Expenditure on education for 2000 amounted
to 17.5 per cent of total expenditure while
that on health for 1997 amounted to 8.1 per
cent of the total.
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